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THE PLACE OF DOMESTIC WORK IN EUROPE: 
An analysis of current policy in the light of the Council Decision authorising 
Member States to ratify ILO Convention No.189 




The recent Decision of the Council recommending ratification of ILO Convention No. 
189 fails to recognise the ways in which European Uunion (EU) law has facilitated 
cheap informal labour in the domestic sphere so as to enable participation in the 
formal labour market. This article examines the approach taken by EU Member 
States to the drafting of Convention No. 189 and argues that, despite its resultant 
diluted content, this instrument requires certain fundamental changes to the current 
treatment of domestic workers in the EU. We further propose a reorientation of the 
‘flexicurity’ principle to enable reform, such that contemporary modes of work can be 
reconsidered and transformed. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In a Council Decision of 28 January 2014, ‘Member States are hereby authorised to 
ratify… the Convention concerning decent work for domestic workers, 2011, of the 
International Labour Organisation (Convention No 189)’.1 This Decision was 
explicitly issued on the basis that: ‘Most of the rules under Convention No 189 
concerning decent work for domestic workers, 2011, of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO)… are covered to a large extent by Union acquis in the areas of 
social policy, anti-discrimination, judicial cooperation in criminal matters and asylum 
and immigration’.2  
 
In this article, we do not purport to provide an exhaustive analysis of how ILO 
Convention No. 189 impacts on all these areas of EU law, but focus on the 
implications for social policy and labour law. We argue that, despite the attempt of 
EU States in the ILO drafting processes to tame the content of ILO Convention No. 
189 and limit its impact on the labour laws of European States, the Convention 
prompts a rethink of certain elements of EU social policy. In particular, we challenge 
the assumption that the EU laws relating to working time and health and safety meet 
the standards of decent work for domestic workers. There is, we contend, an inherent 
conflict between recognition of the legal entitlements of domestic workers and the 
                                                 
1 (2014/51/EU) [2014] OJ L 32/32, Art. 1. 
2 Ibid., Preamble, recital 2.  
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ways in which employment promotion and flexicurity are currently pursued. Cheap 
labour provided by domestic workers currently provides an insecure foundation for 
European labour markets. In order to encourage greater female participation in the 
formal labour market, it may be preferable to allow for more flexible working 
arrangements to enable skilled work and family life to be reconciled more easily, and 
it may also be better for the state to be prepared to shoulder more of the burden of 
child and other care.  
 
This article begins by considering the phenomenon of domestic work and the role that 
such work currently plays in European labour markets, and notes the hesitance of the 
EU to regulate in this field. The second part analyses the role that EU States played in 
the process of drafting of ILO Convention No. 189 (and the accompanying 
Recommendation No. 201), observing how they succeeded in imposing some 
limitations on the coverage of the Convention, and on the extent to which working 
time and health and safety standards are to apply to domestic workers. The third and 
final part argues that the EU has to consider more broadly whether current policies 
associated with employment promotion are sustainable when domestic workers are 
subject to greater legal protections. Flexicurity should not equate to ‘flexi-precarity’,3 
but should involve a genuine attempt to re-orientate working conditions to reconcile 
work and home life.   
                                                 
3 J. López, S. Canalda & A. de le Court, ‘Flexiprecarity: A Spanish Version of 
Flexicurity’, paper delivered at LLRN inaugural conference, Barcelona (2013) 
available at: http://www.upf.edu/gredtiss/_pdf/2013-
LLRNConf_LopezEtAl_xv2x.pdf; see also S. Fredman, ‘Women at Work: The 
Broken Promise of Flexicurity’, (2004) 33(4) Industrial Law Journal 299. 
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2.  DOMESTIC WORK AS A FOUNDATION FOR EU EMPLOYMENT 
PROMOTION 
 
Paid domestic work has been a hidden, but vital aspect of employment promotion 
within Europe under the European Employment Strategy (EES). Domestic workers 
enable certain women, previously excluded from the labour market (by social 
prejudices regarding their role within the home), to be able to engage in paid work, 
even though they continue to ‘shoulder a disproportionate amount of unpaid care 
work’.4 Additionally, as women’s previous (and continuing) unpaid work in the 
household enabled men to be economic actors, so too does the phenomenon of paid 
domestic work.5 This section considers how EU ‘employment promotion’ policies 
have increased the demand for domestic work. However, despite ever-increasing 
demand for their labour, the EU and certain Member States remain reluctant to 
regulate such matters as working time and health and safety for domestic workers. 
 
                                                 
4 Report of the Director-General, Report I(A), A New Era of Social Justice, ILC, 100th 
Session, 2011 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2011) at 15. 
5 ILO, Decent Work for Domestic Workers, Report No. IV(1) ILC 99th Session, 2010 
(Geneva: ILO, 2010) at 9. 
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Employment promotion, flexicurity and women’s working patterns 
 
In the 1990s, it became evident that if the EU was to enhance economic productivity it 
needed to make the best use of its entire workforce.6 Accordingly, women’s 
employment became ‘a key issue to the enhancement and effectiveness of European 
welfare states’, and the European Employment Strategy introduced ‘equal 
employment policies in Europe’.7 An active employment promotion policy has 
continued to be pursued in Europe through the elusive ideal of ‘flexicurity’, a 
combination of flexibility of the job market (which allows employers to dismiss more 
freely than was previously the case) combined with forms of security for workers (in 
terms of access to retraining, reskilling and thereby rehiring within the labour 
market).8 As Günther Schmid has observed: ‘Despite many conceptual drawbacks of 
the flexicurity strategy… its central objective of increasing employment and labour 
                                                 
6 See Commission White Paper, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The 
Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century COM(93)700, 5 December 1993. 
7 S. Betzelt and S. Bothfeld, ‘Incoherent Strategies – Fragmented Outcomes: Raising 
Women’s Employment Rate in Germany’, (2011) 7(1) German Policy Studies 73 at 
74. 
8 See Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Spring European 
Council, Time to Move up a Gear (2006) Brussels. See also Commission 
Communication, Towards Common Principles of Flexicurity, COM(2007)359. For a 
discussion of how flexicurity could be implemented nationally, see T. Wilthagen and 
S. Bekker, 'Flexicurity: Is Europe Right on Track?’, in F. Hendrickx (ed.), Flexicurity 
and the Lisbon Agenda: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective (Intersentia, 2008). 
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force participation is still valid.’9 It has been observed that ‘the flexicurity strategy 
assumes an individualized “adult worker model family”… with both women and men 
in the labour market.’10 In other words, it is now widely accepted that two incomes 
are required to support a family and a woman’s place is not only in the home but in 
work. This is the ‘dual-earner household’ identified as the new ‘gender contract’ by 
Judy Fudge.11 
 
The result of active employment policies, which are designed to place certain women 
in paid work outside the home, is that someone has to do at least some of their care 
and other home work for them. Certainly, the evidence is that, in order to pursue 
careers in professional occupations such as accountancy or medicine, women have to 
be prepared to take on existing male work patterns which involve long hours.12 The 
capacity of women to engage in this type of ‘high status’ paid work outside the home 
is, accordingly, dependent on extensive replacement labour for the traditional 
                                                 
9 G. Schmid, ‘Non-Standard Employment in Europe: Its Development and 
Consequences for the European Employment Strategy’, (2011) 7 German Policy 
Studies 171 at 172. 
10 J. Lewis and A. Plomien, ‘“Flexicurity” as a Policy Strategy: The Implications for 
Gender Equality’, (2009) 38 Economy and Society 433 at 434. 
11 J. Fudge, A New Gender Contract? Work/Life Balance and Working-Time 
Flexibility’, in J. Conaghan and K. Rittich (eds), Labour Law, Work and Family 
(Oxford University Press, 2005) at 269 – 272. 
12 R. Crompton and C. Lyonette, ‘Women's Career Success and Work–life 
Adaptations in the Accountancy and Medical Professions in Britain’, (2010) 18 
Gender Work& Organization 231. 
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reproductive roles taken on by women in the home, namely those services which 
enable production outside the home. These include housework, child care and care for 
the elderly and other dependants.13 The majority of the replacement workers are 
women, though a significant number of men are paid to do domestic work as 
gardeners, guards and chauffeurs.14  
 
There seem to be a number of alternative ways in which employment promotion could 
be achieved. First, employment patterns in the formal labour market could be 
                                                 
13 P. Emmenegger, ‘Gendering Insiders and Outsiders: Labour Market Status and 
Preferences for Job Security’ REC-WP 02/2010, 12-14. See also for a discussion of 
the Spanish experience, M. León, ‘A Real Job? Regulating Household Work: The 
Case of Spain’, (2013) 20 European Journal of Women’s Studies 170 at 173. Note 
also the potential to make distinctions between different forms of care work, giving 
more status to nursing or childcare as opposed to housework. We do not seek to draw 
such distinctions here, as all such work is enabling of paid work outside the 
household. See A. Blackett, ‘Introduction: Regulating Decent Work for Domestic 
Workers’, (2011) 23 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1 at 1 
14 See ILO, Decent Work for Domestic Workers, Report No. IV(1) ILC 99th Session, 
2010 (Geneva: ILO, 2010) at 6. There are of course issues of status and not only 
replacement labour involved in some domestic work provided to high income 
households (for which see B. Anderson, ‘Just Another Job? The Commodification of 
Domestic Work’, in E. Ehrenreich and A. R. Hochschild, Global Woman: Nannies, 
Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy (Granta, 2002)), but our concern here is 
with the larger grouping of middle class professional workers in respect of which we 
are genuinely describing the phenomenon of replacement labour.  
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changed, and made more flexible, so that it becomes easier to take on such jobs 
without the need for (so much) replacement reproductive labour. Second, replacement 
reproductive labour could be made available in the shape of high quality, state 
subsidised care for children and the elderly, as it is in those EU States which initially 
offered a model of flexicurity such as Denmark and Sweden.15 However, state 
spending on child care is by no means common to all Member States; in the UK for 
example, working hours for full time employees tend to be long, state subsidised care 
is limited, and domestic workers are usually hired either through private providers 
(such as agencies), or on an individual basis.   
 
The situation is exacerbated by the economic crisis. The recession across Europe has 
led to a marked decline in the State provision of childcare.16  And, as rates of ‘skilled 
pay’ decline in real terms within the professions,17 the wage squeeze (and a reduction 
                                                 
15 L. L. Hansen, ‘From Flexicurity to FlexicArity? Gendered Perspectives on the 
Danish Model’, (2007) 3(2) Journal of Social Sciences 88 at 91.  
16 A. McKay, J. Campbell, E. Thomson and S. Ross, ‘Economic Recession and 
Recovery in the UK: What's Gender Got to Do with It?’, (2013) 19(3) Feminist 
Economics  108; P. Blackburn, ‘Future Directions for a UK Childcare Market’, in E. 
Lloyd and H. Penn (eds), Childcare Markets: Can They Deliver an Equitable Service? 
(Policy Press, 2013) 
17 J.E. Foster and M.C. Wolfson, ‘Polarization and the Decline of the Middle Class: 
Canada and the U.S.’, (2010) 8(2) The Journal of Economic Inequality 247; T. 
Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Belknap/Harvard University Press, 
2014). 
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in the quality of terms and conditions) then also occurs for the domestic workforce 
drawn in to plug the gap in reproductive labour.   
 
The literature has identified significant ‘gendered’ effects.18 One of the effects of the 
flexicurity paradigm, has been the creation of a number of part-time, temporary and 
agency worker-related jobs. These have been taken on predominantly by women, who 
have suffered as regards their earnings and a loss of job security.19  There appears to 
have been a high-skill/low-skill polarization of labour in European labour markets.  
Where women cannot take on the high time demands of skilled professional work, 
they suffer the consequences in terms of the type of work they can do, as well as 
remuneration and other terms and conditions.20 In the recent financial crisis, there has 
been a further decline of what Leah Vosko has described as the ‘Standard 
Employment Relationship’, so that many women are engaged in precarious work 
outside the home.21 
 
                                                 
18 Hansen (2007) n15 at 90 and 92.  
19 Fredman (2004) n3. 
20  M. Goos and A. Manning, ‘Lousy and Lovely Jobs: The rising polarization of work 
in Britain’, (2007) 89(1) The Review of Economics and Statistics 118. 
21 L. Vosko, Managing the Margins: Gender. Citizenship and the International 
Regulation of Precarious Employment (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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The result of this vulnerability is an understandable anxiety among the ‘flexible’ 
workforce, which is now identified in relevant literature.22 With the over-
representation of women in ever more flexible and even ‘zero-hours contracts’ 
working arrangements,23 it is a brave worker who is prepared to tell an employer that 
she will not work on a particular day when suddenly called upon to do so.24 Further, 
many such women are now taking on roles as if they were in business on their ‘own 
account’,25 but again are required by the ‘client’ for whom they work, at any moment, 
to dedicate their services on-call. Again, this means that cover has to be found at short 
                                                 
22 T. Berglund, B. Furåker, P. Vulkan, ‘Is Job Insecurity Compensated for by 
Employment and Income Security?’, (2014) 35(1) Economic and Industrial 
Democracy 165. 
23 Office for National Statistics, Analysis of Employee Contracts that do 
not Guarantee a Minimum Number of Hours (2014) available at:  
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_361578.pdf. See also T. Warren, ‘Economic 
Crisis, Work-Life Balance and Class’, in K. Farnsworth, Z. Irving and M. Fenger 
(eds) Social Policy Review 26: Analysis and debate in social policy 2014 (Policy 
Press, 2014). 
24 Occupational instability thereby operates as a disciplinary mechanism. See M. 
Pedaci, ‘The Flexibility Trap: Temporary Jobs and Precarity as a Disciplinary 
Mechanism’ (2010) 13 The Journal of Labor and Society 245 especially at 255 
onwards. 
25 G. Schmid, ‘Non-Standard Employment in Europe: Its Development and 
Consequences for the European Employment Strategy’, (2011) 7 German Policy 
Studies 171 at 184-6 who is more optimistic than we are regarding the capacity of this 
type of work to facilitate integration of female workers into the labour market. 
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notice for standard caring responsibilities. As this work is typically poorly paid and ad 
hoc, the amount that any worker can pay a child minder, or a carer for any other 
dependant, is likewise limited and the hours demanded will likewise be lengthy and 
erratic.  
 
If these precarious workers are our secondary female workforce, domestic workers 
become the vulnerable female underclass;26 and, as we shall see, their situation has 
conventionally lain outside EU policy concerns or the notion of ‘flexicurity’. They are 
often in receipt of low pay, long working hours and poor conditions,27 which have the 
potential to harm their health and safety.28 This is compounded by the fact that they 
tend not to be covered by basic protective employment laws (as we shall see).  Even if 
protected under basic working time and health and safety legislation, it would be 
difficult for domestic workers to enforce their rights.  The informality and isolation in 
which domestic workers often work29 is not conducive to inspection or collective 
                                                 
26 M. Gallotti, The Gender Dimension of Domestic Work in Western Europe (ILO, 
2009) at 5. 
27 ILO, Decent Work for Domestic Workers, Report No. IV(1) ILC 99th Session, 2010 
(ILO, 2010) at 7, which may be for discriminatory reasons not only in terms of gender 
but of ethnicity or race. 
28 Ibid., at 61-3.  
29 See P. Smith, ‘The Pitfalls of Home: Protecting the Health and Safety of Paid 
Domestics’, (2011) 23 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 309; also B. 
Anderson, Doing the Dirty Work: The Global Politics of Domestic Labour (London: 
Zed Books, 2000) especially chs 1 and 2. 
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action.30 Further, domestic workers are often from ethnic minorities or recent 
immigrants,31 which may mean that they have limited ability to contest their 
treatment; not only due to language difficulties, but also as a result of their visa status, 
which may make them vulnerable to deportation if they challenge their current 
employer.32 Being some distance from home, they may also be dependent on their 
employer for housing, making it difficult to contest their employer’s instructions 
(when unreasonable)33 and even, in the worst cases, being made a prisoner in a home 
(when their passport is taken or they are locked in).34 Yet, the reluctance of the EU to 
even begin to offer them basic rights, let alone make particular provision for their 
protection, hardly seems conducive to the idea of ‘decent work’.35 
 
                                                 
30 See discussion in M. Thompson, ‘Workers – not Maids – Organising Household 
Workers in Mexico’, (2009) 17(2) Gender and Development 281. 
31 S. Van Walsum, ‘Regulating Migrant Domestic Work in the Netherlands: 
Opportunities and Pitfalls’ in (2011) 23(1) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 
141. 
32 This was recognised in the establishment of the UK NGO Kalayaan (meaning 
‘freedom’ or ‘liberty’) in 1987 which focuses on provision of assistance to migrant 
domestic workers. See http://www.kalayaan.org.uk/. 
33 See Thompson n30. See, for example, the facts of Hounga v Allen [2014] UKSC 
47, [2014] ICR 847.  
34 M. Lalani, Ending the Abuse: Polices that work to protect migrant workers 
(Kalayaan, 2011) 34-5. 
35 See the wording of the Council Decision cited at n.1. 
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The EU response to women’s experience of work and domestic work 
 
Women’s work in spheres outside the household has come to be heavily regulated 
under EU law, such that they are for example provided with protection from 
discrimination and offered access to equal pay.36 These may, indeed, be regarded as 
forms of incentive for leaving care of children and others to engage in what is 
regarded as more productive economic activity. The same has not been true of 
domestic work, which has remained in the regulatory shadows, despite growing 
evidence of exploitation some amounting to human rights abuses and failure to apply 
normal labour standards.37  
 
Like the Council of Europe, the EU has now shown signs of addressing such abuses. 
The Council of Europe, through application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, has initiated action 
                                                 
36 E.g. Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 
2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), 
[2006] OJ L 204/23. 
37 V. Mantouvalou, ‘Human Rights for Precarious Workers: The Legislative 
Preariousness of Domestic Labor’, (2012) 34(1) Comparative Labor Law Journal 101 
especially at 111-112 and C. Murphy, ‘The Enduring Vulnerability of Migrant 
Domestic Workers in Europe’, (2013) 62(3) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 599.  
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to address trafficking, slavery and other forms of servitude.38 The EU has now 
followed the Council of Europe’s lead, via the 2011 EU Directive on Human 
Trafficking39 and the accompanying European Commission strategy for 2012-16.40  
 
However, other opportunities to regulate domestic work have not been taken. The 
European Parliament has been more eager for EU action than the Council of 
Ministers. As early as 2000, a European Parliament resolution on regulating domestic 
help in the informal sector,41 called for a European definition of domestic work to be 
drawn up; took the view that the domestic work sector in principle falls within the 
scope of existing directives on employment; called for due account to be taken, when 
drawing up directives and other legislation, of the specific work situations and 
employment relationships of domestic workers, including their isolation and their 
atypical relationship with their employer(s); and called on the Member States to 
                                                 
38 See Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 
2005 (CETS No. 197 – entry into force 2008); and the judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Siliadin v France  Application No. 73316/01, 26 July 2006; 
also, for discussion of these developments, see V. Mantouvalou,  ‘Modern Slavery: 
The UK Response’ (2010) 39 Industrial Law Journal 425.  
39 Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 
2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its 
victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA; [2011] OJ L 
101/1. 
40 Commission Communication, The EU Strategy towards the Eradication of 
Trafficking in Human Beings 2012–2016 COM(2012) 286 final. 
41 2000/2021(INI) 30 November 2000. 
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involve the social partners closely in the implementation of the guidelines for the 
domestic work sector. 
 
Further, Article 31(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000 (EUCFR) states 
that ‘[e]very worker has the right to working conditions which respect his or her 
health, safety and dignity’. Under Article 31(2) ‘every worker’ also ‘has the right to 
limitation of maximum working hours, to daily and weekly rest periods and to an 
annual period of paid leave’. The explanatory notes indicate that these provisions are 
based on Directives relating to health and safety42 and to working time;43 but both 
instruments allow exceptions for domestic work.  
 
 
Article 3 of the Health and Safety ‘Framework’ Directive specifically excludes 
‘domestic servants’.44 The UK has used the opportunity afforded by the EU legal 
framework to ensure that domestic workers in the UK are not covered by standard 
                                                 
42 Art. 31(1) is said to be ‘based on Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of 
measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work’ and 
to draw also on European Social Charter and Community Charter provisions. 
43 Article 31(2) is said to be ‘based on Directive 93/104/EC concerning certain aspects 
of the organisation of working time, Article 2 of the European Social Charter and 
point 8 of the Community Charter on the rights of workers’. 
44 Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures 
to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, [1989] OJ L 
183/1, Article 3. 
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health and safety standards.45 Article 17 of the Working Time Directive  allows for 
derogations for ‘family workers’, as well as a general derogation where ‘on account of 
the specific characteristics of the activity concerned the duration of the working time 
is not measured and/or predetermined or can be determined by the workers 
themselves’.46 The UK has interpreted this provision as providing the basis for a 
general exclusion of domestic workers from coverage by the Directive. Regulation 19 
of the Working Time Regulations 1998 excludes any ‘worker employed as a domestic 
servant in a private household’ from certain key entitlements to regulation of working 
time, such as maximum weekly working time, length of night work, and restrictions 
that can be set by employers when there is a risk to health and safety of a worker. 
There is no sign of imminent legal reform in the UK on this issue – or the threat of 
Commission enforcement proceedings against the UK. The status quo seems to be 
deemed acceptable. 
 
There is an interesting legal question as to whether these legislative exceptions 
regarding domestic work are consistent with the statement in Article 31 of the 
EUCFR that health and safety and working time entitlements are applicable to ‘every 
worker’. Could Article 31 thereby be invoked by domestic workers to challenge their 
apparent exclusion from coverage by the Directives or the implementation of those 
exceptions? The answer seems to us to be unclear from the AMS judgment of the 
                                                 
45 This is the result of s 51 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 
46 Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, 
[2003] OJ L 299/9. 
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Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).47 In that case, it was said that Article 
27 of the EUCFR only guaranteed information and consultation ‘in the cases and 
under the conditions provided for by European Union law and national laws and 
practices’,48 had in order to be ‘fully effective’ to ‘be given more specific expression 
in European Union or national law’.49 Article 27 was not itself considered ‘sufficient 
to confer on individuals an individual right which they may invoke as such’.50  
 
The CJEU acknowledged that different treatment was afforded to non-discrimination 
on grounds of age, which was treated as an ‘individual right’ in Kücükdeveci.51 The 
latter case seems distinguishable on the basis that Article 21(1) has a broad pedigree. 
This is apparent from the explanatory notes, which do not refer to the Directives 
concerning equality rights, but rather the foundational EC Treaty and also Article 14 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. By way of contrast, the explanatory 
notes accompanying Articles 27 and 31 in the Solidarity Chapter of the EUCFR 
mention explicitly the connection to relevant Directives, but also the less generally 
ratified Social Charter and Community Charter provisions on which the rights are 
based.  
 
                                                 
47 Case C-176/12 Association de mediation sociale (AMS) v CGT, Judgment of 15 
January 2014 (AMS). 
48  Ibid., para. 44. 
49 Ibid., para. 45. 
50 Ibid., para. 49. 
51 Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci v Sweden GmbH & Co. KG [2010] ECR I-365; AMS, 
para. 47. 
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We consider that right to health and safety and to constraints on working time have a 
significant individual dimension and can be regarded as freestanding, given that no 
express reference is included in Article 31 of the EUCFR to other provisions in EU 
law (as is the case in respect of Article 27).52 Even if the content of health and safety 
or the scope of working time, rest and annual leave provisions might need to be 
further determined by legislation (possibly allowing differences in respect of certain 
categories of workers, such as those engaged in domestic work), Article 31 does not 
seem from its reference to ‘every worker’ to allow the wholesale exclusion of any 
category of worker. However, our interpretation of Article 31 presumes that domestic 
workers are to be properly regarded as ‘workers’, which as we shall see below is 
contested by some EU Member States.53 Further, the outcome in AMS does not 
encourage us to think that Article 31 will be regarded by the CJEU as suitable for 
citation in ‘a dispute between individuals’; the ‘specific expression’ requirement 
imposed by the Court suggesting a high hurdle for any litigant to overcome.54 In this 
context, it is state compliance with the relevant Directives that seems likely to 
                                                 
52 Furthermore, the reference in Article 16 to EU law and national laws and practices 
has not impeded the often controversial application of Article 16 of the EUCFR. See 
Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron and others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd [2013] IRLR 744, 
Judgment of 18 July 2013. 
53 See Case C-256/01, Allonby v Accrington and Rosedale Community College [2004] 
ECR I-873, para. 67; also Case C-413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat 
der Nederlanden, unrep. Judgment of 4 December 2014. 
54 E. Frantziou, ‘Case C-176/12 Association de Médiation Sociale: Some Reflections 
on the Horizontal Effect of the Charter and the Reach of Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional L. Rev. 332, at 341-2. 
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matter.55 Addressing issues for domestic workers regarding health and safety 
alongside working time may therefore require shifts in policy approaches 
accompanied by legislative reform. They are unlikely to be resolved simply by human 
rights based litigation.  
 
 
3. EU PARTICIPATION IN THE DRAFTING OF THE ILO CONVENTION 
AND RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING DOMESTIC WORK 
 
It should be acknowledged that, like the EU, the ILO had not previously demanded 
regulation of domestic work, but rather had allowed States to derogate from standard 
employment law norms in relation to particular types of work. A resolution adopted 
by the ILO in 1965 stated the ‘urgent need’ for standards pertaining to domestic work 
which were ‘compatible with the self-respect and human dignity which are essential 
to social justice for domestic workers’;56 but acknowledgement of that need did not 
lead to the adoption of any specific ILO convention or recommendation to establish 
such standards. Instead, scope was given to Member States to derogate from ILO 
Convention standards, which was often exercised in respect of domestic workers.   
 
Several EU Member States known more generally for their extensive protection of 
labour standards have, significantly, taken advantage of these exceptions in relation to 
domestic work. For example, in relation to the Holidays with Pay Convention 
                                                 
55 AMS, para. 51. 
56 Reported Official Bulletin (Geneva) Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, July 1965, Supplement I, 
20-1 as discussed in Blackett  (2011) n.13 at 7. 
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(Revised) 1970 (No. 132), Article 2(2) was relied upon by Belgium in its first report 
on application of Convention so as to exclude coverage of domestic workers. That 
Article stated that: ‘In so far as necessary, measures may be taken by the competent 
authority or through the appropriate machinery in a country, after consultation with 
the organisations of employers and workers concerned, where such exist, to exclude 
from the application of this Convention limited categories of employed persons in 
respect of whose employment special problems of a substantial nature, relating to 
enforcement or to legislative or constitutional matters, arise.’ Likewise, the 
Netherlands relied on Article 3(1) of the Part-Time Work Convention 1994 (No. 175) 
in a declaration accompanying ratification on 5 October 2001, again on the basis that 
domestic workers constituted a ‘particular category of worker’, to whom the 
application of standards ‘would raise particular problems of a substantial nature’; and 
Luxembourg relied on Article 5 of the Medical Care and Sickness Benefits 
Convention 1969 (No. 130) so as to exclude workers employed for less than 16 hours 
per week.  
 
Domestic workers can, at least in principle, claim the more far-reaching human rights 
protection of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
1998. Given that they are norms embedded in the ILO Constitution, the following 
core labour standards must apply to domestic workers:  
 (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining;  
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour;  
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and  
(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. 
 21 
These are entitlements of domestic workers as ‘workers’ and they acquire rights under 
the European Convention on Human Rights which are applicable to ‘every one’. 
  
With this in mind, ILO International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour 
(IPEC) project work has included combating child labour in the domestic work 
sector.57 This is in line with broader UN requirements, for example the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime 2000. The UN Special Rapporteur has made specific comments on 
situation of migrant and other domestic workers.58 The UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination also commented on the predicaments faced by 
domestic workers in 2004.59 Moreover, UNICEF has been active on child domestic 
work.60 By 2010 there were indications that previously tolerated exclusion of 
                                                 
57 See, for e.g., IPEC, Helping Hands or Shackled Lives? Understanding child 
domestic labour and responses to it (ILO, 2004); IPEC, Guidelines on the Design of 
Direct Action Strategies to combat Child Domestic Labour (ILO, 2007).  
58 See for the specific role and findings of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights 
of migrants: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/SRMigrantsIndex.aspx 
59 See http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/country/lebanon2004.html; see also CERD, 
General Recommendation 30, Discrimination against non-citizens, para. 34.  
60 ILO/UNICEF, Training Manual to Fight Trafficking in Children for Labour, 
Sexual and Other Forms of Exploitation (International Labour Office, 2009). 
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domestic workers from labour standards was now unacceptable.61  
 
This section considers how ILO Convention No. 189 and the accompanying 
Recommendation offer domestic workers protections beyond those applicable under 
standard human rights provisions and special measures relating to trafficking. We 
consider the role that EU Member States played in the process of drafting the 
Convention and the norms that have ultimately been concretised by the ILO 
instruments on domestic work. 
 
It should be noted that an ILO Convention or Recommendation is adopted by a two-
thirds majority of the tripartite delegation present at the annual ILO International 
Labour Conference or ‘ILC’ (so that each country is represented by two government 
delegates and one employer and one worker delegate).62 The Convention constitutes a 
formally binding legal instrument in respect of those States which ratify the 
instrument. Further, even when not ratified, there is also an obligation to report at 
‘appropriate intervals as requested by the Governing Body, the position of its law and 
practice in regard to the matters dealt with in the Convention, showing the extent to 
which effect has been given, or is proposed to be given, to any of the provisions of the 
Convention by legislation, administrative action, collective agreement or otherwise 
and stating the difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification of such 
Convention’.63 An ILO Recommendation, by way of contrast, operates as a softer 
                                                 
61 ILO, Decent Work for Domestic Workers, Report No. IV(1) ILC 99th Session, 2010 
(ILO, 2010) at 24. 
62 See ILO Constitution, Art. 3(1) and Art. 19(2). 
63 ILO Constitution, Art. 19(5). 
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form of international law. There is no suggestion of ratification, but the ILO 
Constitution still requires members to bring a Recommendation adopted by the ILO 
‘before the authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies for the 
enactment of legislation or other action’ and again to report  ‘at appropriate intervals 
as requested by the Governing Body, the position of the law and practice in their 
country in regard to the matters dealt with in the Recommendation, showing the 
extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to be given, to the provisions of 
the Recommendation and such modifications of these provisions as it has been found 
or may be found necessary to make in adopting or applying them’.64  
 
Compliance with Conventions and Recommendations is considered by an ILO 
Committee of Experts and Conference Committee,65 which may lead ultimately to the 
adoption of a ‘special paragraph’ (a public condemnatory statement) by the ILC. 
Further measures are possible for enforcement of Conventions. 66 By way of contrast, 
the ILO Constitution is regarded as binding on all ILO Member States (and the 
guarantee of ‘freedom of association’ has its own special supervisory machinery 
before a tripartite ILO Governing Body Committee). Notably, the supervisory systems 
are all concerned with exposing concerns rather than taking concrete punitive 
measures against certain countries; with a solitary resolution taken in respect of forced 
                                                 
64 ILO Constitution, Art. 19(6).  
65 Established by ILC Resolution in 1926. For controversy over the current process, 
see C. La Hovary, ‘Employers’ Group 2012 Challenge to the Right to Strike’, (2013) 
42(4) Industrial Law Journal 338; and Janice Bellace, ’The ILO and the Right to 
Strike’, (2014) 153(1) International Labour Review 29. 
66 ILO Constitution, Arts 24 onwards.  
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labour in Myanmar/Burma being the one exception to this rule.67    
 
Traditionally, due to its restricted competence in the social sphere, EU engagement in 
the ILO was extremely limited. Indeed, such matters were understood to lie within the 
prerogative of individual EU member states. While the Commission has long had a 
voice at the ILC, the capacity to vote on adoption of Conventions and 
Recommendations lies in the hands not only of representatives of the governments of 
EU Member States, but also employer and worker representatives from those 
countries. Ratification lies with the actual governments of EU Member States unless 
matters which come within the sphere of exclusive EU competence are affected,68 and 
there remains uncertainty as to matters of shared competence such as EU social 
policy.69 In practice, EU Members States aligned as a distinctive group in debates 
                                                 
67 Under Article 33 of the ILO Constitution, lifted in 2013 – see 
http://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/102/media-centre/news/WCMS_216355/lang--
en/index.htm. See also Robyn Layton QC, ‘Forced Labour in Burma: A Summary of 
the International Labour Organisation Report & Subsequent Developments’, (2000) 4 
Southern Cross University Law Review148. 
68 Where there is a clear conflict between an ILO norm and a key EU legislative 
instrument, then it would see that the EU Member State will be obliged to denounce 
the relevant ILO Convention. See C-203/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-935, 
discussed by P. Herzfeld Olsson, ‘The ILO Acquis and EU Labour Law’, in M. 
Rönnmar (ed.), Labour Law: Fundamental Rights and Social Europe (Hart, 2011) at 
52-3. 
69 (2014/51/EU) [2014] OJ L 32/32, Recitals (2), (3) and (4).  Cf. Opinion 2/91 
regarding ILO Convention No. 170 on Chemicals at Work [1993] ECR I-1061. 
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relating to domestic work, speaking sometimes as a collective EU voice70 and at 
others as individual governments.    
 
Acknowledgement of the need for employment promotion and protection 
 
The ILO Convention recognises explicitly the role domestic work plays in 
employment promotion. The Preamble recognises, in particular, ‘the significant 
contribution of domestic workers to the global economy, which includes increasing 
paid job opportunities for women and men workers with family responsibilities, 
greater scope caring for ageing populations, children and persons with a disability…’ 
This was an aspect stressed by the EU Government representatives early in the 
drafting process. They argued that domestic work ‘contributed to the creation of 
wealth by allowing family members to work and to balance their personal, family and 
professional life’.71 This is in line with the EU policies relating to employment 
promotion discussed above. 
 
In the Recommendation there is also acknowledgement of the need for further 
integrating domestic workers into the formal workforce and allowing them 
opportunities to progress towards other kinds of work. Article 25 of the 
                                                 
70 Note the reference to ‘speaking on behalf of Government members of the Member 
States of the EU’ registered in the drafting Committee on Domestic workers referred 
to in ILO, Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers, Record of Proceedings, 
ILC, 100th Session (ILO, 2011), 15/4 at para. 15. 
71 ILO, Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers, Record of Proceedings, ILC, 
99th Session (ILO, 2010), 12/7. 
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Recommendation provides that ratifying States should ‘encourage the continuing 
development of the competencies and qualifications of domestic workers, including 
literacy training as appropriate, in order to enhance their professional development 
and employment opportunities’, as well as ‘address the work-life balance needs of 
domestic workers’ and attempt to ‘reconcile work and family responsibilities’. 
Statistics should be compiled, alongside development of ‘appropriate indicators and 
measurement systems for this purpose’.72 Such an approach seems consistent with the 
EU endorsement of forms of flexicurity which involve ongoing training, and flexible 
working which assists participation in working life.   
 
Human rights protections versus labour standards 
 
The governments of EU Member States were emphatic that human rights of domestic 
workers should be protected, for example resisting removal of reference to key ILO 
Conventions which protected against child labour on the basis that ‘those Conventions 
were fundamental labour standards’.73  Their view was that the Convention should ‘… 
focus on fundamental principles and rights concerning domestic work, while 
                                                 
72 Note that this was at the initiative of the ILO Workers’ Group, rather than the EU. 
The Worker Vice-Chairperson would rather have seen this provision included in the 
Convention, but compromised with the Employer Vice-Chairperson to allow its 
inclusion in the Recommendation. See Report of the Committee on Domestic 
Workers (2011), 15/73, paras 756-8. 
73 Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers (2011) 15/29, para. 248, opposing a 
proposed amendment made by the Employer Vice-Chairman. 
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remaining flexible enough to ensure wide ratification’.74 As far as labour standards 
were concerned, they accepted the need to consider ‘working time arrangements for 
domestic workers’ and ‘occupational health and safety’; this would also be consistent 
with Article 31 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as noted above.75 Yet, as we 
shall see, the EU countries were eager to limit the workers to whom such standards 
should apply and, indeed, the content of the standards themselves.  
 
Application to all ‘domestic workers’? 
 
The coverage of Convention No. 189 is problematic for two reasons. First, there is a 
potential difficulty with the definition of ‘domestic worker’. Article 1(b) of the 
Convention states that: ‘the term “domestic worker” means any person engaged in 
domestic worker within an employment relationship’. That employment relationship 
would not, it seems, cover those engaged in casual work. Under Article 1(c) ‘a person 
who performs domestic work only occasionally or sporadically and not on an 
occupational basis is not a domestic worker’. This was the position argued for by the 
Government member of Spain on behalf of EU Member States at an early stage of 
                                                 
74 Ibid. 15/4, para. 15. Cf. note at 15/13, para. 54 the concerns of the Worker Vice-
Chairperson who ‘recognized that the instruments should provide flexibility and 
indicated that the notion was already embedded in some of the proposed provisions. 
However, a proper balance needed to be struck as flexibility should not weaken the 
protection of domestic workers in these instruments.’ See reiteration of this principle 
at the end of the drafting process: Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers 
(2011), 15/118, para. 1257. 
75 Ibid., 15/4, para. 15. 
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drafting, so that those who performed occasional domestic work ‘as a marginal 
activity’ and not as ‘professional domestic workers’ would not be covered by the 
Convention.76  
 
Perhaps more worrying is the second potential exemption which is permitted in 
Article 2 after the statement in paragraph (1) that ‘The Convention applies to all 
domestic workers’. It is then said that States may ‘after consulting with the most 
representative organizations of employers and workers and, where they exist, with 
organizations representative of domestic workers and those representative of 
employers of domestic workers, exclude wholly or partially from its scope 
(a) categories of workers who are otherwise provided with at least 
equivalent protection; 
(b) limited categories of workers in respect of which special problems of a 
substantial nature arise.’ 
 
Any ratifying State who thus excludes a category of domestic work from coverage 
will be required under its first report on the application of the Convention explain 
fully ‘the reasons for such exclusion’ and in subsequent reports elaborate on the 
measures taken ‘with a view to extending the application of the Convention to the 
workers concerned’. What is immediately obvious, though, is that while consultation 
of representative organisations is required, there is no requirement for their 
agreement. Exclusion thereby lies at the discretion of the State and experience under 
previous ILO Conventions suggests that States, including EU Member States such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands, are likely to avail themselves of this option. In other 
                                                 
76 ILO, Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers (2010), 12/28-31. 
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words, the drafters will allow States to retain the practice of derogating from 
standards in respect of domestic workers, because they create ‘special problems’. This 
may be all the more likely in times of economic crisis when domestic work props up 
an already fragile labour market. It also creates the irony, that while Member States 
acknowledge domestic workers to be amongst the most vulnerable of those in 
employment, they may be treated as exceptional, even without the consent of the 




Under ILO Convention No. 189, Article 7 requires that domestic workers are to be 
informed of their ‘terms and conditions of employment in an appropriate and 
verifiable manner’ including their ‘normal hours of work’, ‘paid annual leave and 
daily and weekly rest periods’.77 Article 10 makes the change most likely to affect EU 
regulation of working time.  
 
                                                 
77 Notably, the EU member States opposed this list of detailed information which a 
domestic worker was to be entitled to receive. They wished merely to opt for a 
formulation whereby the domestic worker was entitled to be notified of the ‘essential 
aspects of the employment relationship’. This objection was withdrawn after debate 
which suggested that other members of the Committee opposed the amendment. See 
Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers (2011), 15/34, para. 309 and 312. Yet 
see the continuation of the essence of this debate regarding ‘terms and conditions of 
employment’ et seq to para. 398. 
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Article 10(1) states that: ‘Each Member shall take measures towards ensuring equal 
treatment between domestic workers and workers generally in relation to normal 
hours of work, overtime compensation, periods of daily and weekly rest and paid 
annual leave in accordance with national laws, regulations or collective agreements, 
taking into account the special characteristics of domestic work’. Obviously, the 
crucial question here is what ‘special characteristics of domestic work’ would justify 
an exception to the principle of equal treatment. The EU member States said that they 
broadly supported the principle of equal treatment, but not, for example, where the 
live-in domestic worker could not easily delineate between working and non-working 
time. They wanted collective agreements to provide exceptions, as they did in the EU 
context.78  
 
There are however some important substantive standards imposed by Article 10, 
which do not seem to be subject to the ‘special characteristics’ proviso (in Article 
10(1)). Article 10(2) requires weekly rest to be at least 24 consecutive hours, while 
under Article 10(3) on-call time is to be regarded as ‘hours of work’.79 This may be 
relevant to  pay as well as regulation of hours of work, as Article 11 obliges States to 
                                                 
78 Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers (2011), 15/51, para. 508 et seq. The 
wholesale exclusion by the UK of domestic workers from working time protection 
was not referred to, however. 
79 A. Blackett, ‘Introductory Note to the Decent Work for Domestic Workers 
Convention, 2011 (No. 189) and Recommendation (No. 201)’, 53 International Legal 
Materials 250 at 251 observes that: ‘The provisions on working time… challenge the 
customary or implicit norms in which domestic workers’ availability is presumed.’ 
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take measures to ensure that domestic workers ‘enjoy minimum wage coverage where 
such coverage exists’, as it does in the UK.80 
 
The Recommendation goes further, providing much more extensive provision in 
respect of working time, although one might well question how effective its 
provisions are likely to be given its secondary status as ‘soft law’. Article 5(2), for 
example, states that domestic workers under the age of 18 should receive particular 
protection by  ‘(a) strictly limiting their hours of work to ensure adequate time for 
rest, education and training, leisure activities and family contacts’ and ‘(b) prohibiting 
nightwork’, while also ‘establishing or strengthening mechanisms to monitor their 
terms and conditions of employment’. The Recommendation’s indication (in Article 
6) that all domestic workers should ‘understand their terms and conditions of 
employment’, ideally through provision of a ‘model contract’ or at least particulars of 
employment, would also help such workers to make sense of their contractual 
obligations as regards working time. Under Article 8, hours of work are to be 
‘accurately recorded’, and under Article 9 on-call time is to be regulated, while under 
Article 10, ‘suitable periods of rest’ are to be made available for meals and other 
breaks, and weekly rest is to be similarly regulated so as not to be accumulated for a 
period longer than fourteen days.81 Furthermore, Article 13 provides that ‘time spent 
                                                 
80 In this regard, note regulation of methods and regularity of payment of domestic 
workers in Article 12. 
81 Notably, the idea of a ‘fixed day’ of rest was rejected by EU Member States, 
leading to adoption of the current wording. See Report of the Committee on Domestic 
Workers (2011), 15/99, para. 1031. Cf. Case C-484/04 Commission v UK [2006] ECR 
I-7471.  
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by domestic workers accompanying the household members on holiday should not be 
counted as part of their paid annual leave’. Again, these entitlements regarding 
working time are applicable to all domestic workers covered by Article 1 of the 
Convention, providing what might be regarded as a valuable supplement to the more 
sparse provisions set out in the Convention, but of course this is a Recommendation, 
as opposed to an instrument binding on States under international law.  
 
However, even in the Recommendation, there are exceptions. Article 12 for example 
contemplates that there may be exceptions to the standard working time rules for 
domestic workers, but at least provides that: ‘National laws, regulations or collective 
agreements should define the grounds on which domestic workers may be required to 
work during the period of daily or weekly rest and provide for adequate compensatory 
rest irrespective of any financial compensation.’  
 
While this might seem to be an extremely moderate set of measures regarding 
working time, it is notable that this was not the view taken by the representative of 
UK employers who expressed considerable concern regarding the status (under 
Article 10(3) of the Convention) of ‘stand by time’ as working time, which was said 
to be an open legal question ‘unresolved at EU level’.82 He concluded that: ‘We 
cannot risk bringing this uncertainty into the family home and compromising the 
                                                 
82 The Court of Justice has found that on-call time can be working time by virtue of 
Case C-303/98 Sindicato de Médicos de Asistencia Pública (Simap) v Conselleria de 
Sanidad y Consumo de la Generalidad Valenciana [2000] I-7963; but not where the 
worker is completely inactive: Case C-151/02 Landeshauptstadt Kiel v Jaegar [2003] 
ECR I-8389. 
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benefits of domestic work to families, women in the workforce and communities 
throughout the United Kingdom.’ By virtue of its treatment of working time, then, 
‘this is simply too prescriptive a Convention to be ratified’.83 Certainly, what the ILO 
Convention does indicate is that the requirement of a weekly 24 hours consecutive 
rest is compulsory and should not be evaded by exclusion of domestic workers from 
the Working Time Directive. 
 
Health and safety 
 
While nearly all governments responding to the International Labour Conference 
consultation were in support of some provision on health and safety, and most 
respondents advocated equality of treatment with other workers.84 The EU asked for a 
nuanced approach. While occupational health and safety should be secured for 
domestic workers, ‘the treatment for domestic workers might be specific to the 
circumstances in which the domestic work took place. In particular, the domestic 
worker’s workplace should be taken into account when setting up conditions of 
protection for domestic workers, in other words making them subject to [l]imited 
restrictions and exclusions’.85 Their proposals were supported by the employer 
representatives in the first drafting Committee on Domestic Workers.86  
                                                 
83 Record of Proceedings, ILC, 100th Session, Eighteenth Sitting, 15 June 2011, 
25(Rev.)/20. 
84 ILO, Decent Work for Domestic Workers  Report IV(2), ILC, 99th Session, 2010 
(ILO, 2010) at 396-7 and 409. 




More explicit protection of health and safety is included in Article 13 of the 
Convention which makes the broad statement in the first paragraph that: ‘Every 
domestic worker has the right to a safe and healthy working environment’. However, 
the same paragraph goes on to allow exceptions to this rule such that the ‘effective 
measures’ which States are to take is to be subject to ‘due regard for the specific 
circumstances of domestic work’. This was a proviso asked for by the EU 
governments,87 and later welcomed by the employer representative from the 
Netherlands in terms of the ‘flexibility’.88  
 
This final text amounts to the dilution of an initial ‘equal treatment’ approach, that 
change to the wording having been initiated by the EU.89 Curiously, the UK 
government does not seem to have been in support of the general EU line on the issue, 
with a statement to the Conference at large, that while the UK ‘already provides 
comprehensive employment and social protection to domestic workers’,…  ‘it is 
occasionally not appropriate to treat domestic workers identically’, giving the 
example of health and safety laws and inspections, which the UK does not consider 
appropriate ‘to cover private households employing domestic workers’.90 It was on 
this basis that the UK said that it ‘will be unable to ratify this Convention in the 
foreseeable future’.91  
                                                 
87 Ibid. 
88 Record of Proceedings (2011), 25(Rev.)/19. 
89 See Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers (2011), 15/62, para. 631 et seq. 
90 Record of Proceedings (2011), 25(Rev.)/22 and 30/7. 
91 Ibid., 30/7. 
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Moreover, the UK does not acknowledge that these measures may further be applied 
‘progressively’ under Article 13(2), militating it seems against the recognition of an 
immediate ‘right’. That gradual approach to implementation can be adopted ‘in 
consultation with the most representative organisations of employers and workers 
and, where they exist, with organisations representative of domestic workers and 
those representative of employers of domestic workers’. Once again, there is no 
requirement to actually obtain the consent of these representatives.92  
 
Also relevant to health and safety are the conditions in which a domestic worker is 
housed. This is not tackled in the Convention, which merely makes provision under 
Article 9 for action by States to ensure that domestic workers (a) ‘are free to reach 
agreement’ with their employer as to whether to reside in the household, (b) are not 
obliged to remain in the household during daily or weekly rest periods, and (c) are 
entitled to keep possession of their travel documents. The quality of any actual 
accommodation is only dealt with under Article 17 of the Recommendation, such that 
accommodation should entail ‘a separate, private room that is suitably furnished, 
adequately ventilated and equipped with a lock, the key to which should be provided 
to the domestic worker’, that there should be ‘access to suitable sanitary facilities’, 
adequate lighting, heating and air conditioning, as well as ‘meals of good quality and 
sufficient quantity’ adapted ‘to the extent reasonable’ to cultural and religious 
requirements.93  
 
                                                 
92 See Report of the Committee on Domestic Workers (2011), paras 645-9. 
93 Ibid., para. 1103 et seq. 
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There is also further elaboration in the Recommendation on what is appropriate 
regarding the health and safety of domestic workers. More attention may need to be 
paid to the specific hazards faced by domestic workers, as opposed to the relaxed 
standards one might read into the Convention. Under Article 19 of the 
Recommendation, States, in consultation with representative organisations, ‘should 
take measures’ to ‘(a) protect domestic workers by eliminating or minimizing, so far 
as is reasonably practicable, work-related hazards and risks, in order to prevent 
injuries, diseases and deaths and promote occupational safety and health in the 
household workplace’ and ‘(b) provide an adequate and appropriate system of 
inspection’, consistent with Article 17 of the Convention [concerning ‘measures for 
labour inspection, enforcement and penalties’] and adequate penalties for violation of 
occupational safety and health laws and regulations.94  
 
Thus, the Convention establishes the principle that domestic workers should be 
covered by health and safety laws, while the Recommendation elaborates on measures 
particular to their circumstances which should be taken. Arguably, both indicate that 
action is required on the part of the EU. Namely, at the very least, to remove the 
wholesale exclusion of domestic workers from EU (and UK) health and safety laws. 
 
4. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR EU REGULATION OF DOMESTIC WORK – 
TRUE FLEXICURITY? 
 
We suggest that the reason for the current paucity of regulation at EU level is the 
place of domestic work within the European Employment Strategy (EES), designed to 
                                                 
94 Ibid., para. 1109 et seq. 
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promote female employment participation within EU Member States so as to enhance 
productivity. The EES has, in this context, used the language of ‘flexicurity’, offering 
a blend of flexibility and security at work to facilitate engagement in paid labour. 
However, thus far, the EES has been premised on the notion that women, in gaining 
access to the mainstream skilled workforce, should replicate male modes of working 
(to achieve security) or suffer the consequences of more flexible casual or 
independent contractor employment status, which would mean that usual employment 
laws would not cover them. As Fredman has observed, the UK provides an excellent 
example of the ways in which pressure to join the workforce has led to no general 
reform of modes of professional or skilled work associated with security, but rather 
the creation of an expedient secondary peripheral and precarious workforce.95 We 
have observed that this secondary workforce itself relies on a tertiary, and even more 
precarious, domestic workforce, which performs the reproductive work otherwise 
required in the household.  
 
While domestic workers are entitled to certain human rights protections, they are not 
apparently entitled to standard EU labour law protections regarding working time or 
health and safety, despite the apparently generous entitlement set out in Article 31 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this light, we have examined the content of 
the recent ILO Convention No. 189 and Recommendation No. 201 in some detail so 
as to consider the role that EU Member States played in the shaping of these norms. 
We have also considered the extent that the ILO Convention, in particular, indicates 
grounds for reform of the EES or EU social policy directives on working time and 
health and safety. 
                                                 
95 Fredman (2004) n.3. 
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It is evident that EU Member States have, in the context of Convention No. 189, 
sought to replicate the kinds of exceptions for the ‘special circumstances’ of domestic 
work previously applicable in ILO Conventions on the basis that these are workers for 
whom ‘special problems of a substantial nature arise’. Reference is therefore made, 
both in relation to working time and health and safety to ‘the special circumstances of 
domestic work’. Commentators like Albin and Mantouvalou have reiterated the ILO 
notion that domestic work is ‘work like no other’,96 but their concern is with trying to 
address the specific circumstances of domestic workers so as to enhance their 
entitlements, as indeed ILO Recommendation No. 201 notably seeks to do, if not 
wholly successfully. They would certainly not consider that the exceptional nature of 
domestic work justifies wholesale exclusion of domestic workers from basic labour 
law protections. 
 
Convention No. 189 and Recommendation No. 201, in part because of the way in 
which their terms have been diluted by EU Government and employer representatives, 
do not create a large body of rights for domestic workers, but nevertheless, there are 
some substantive protections. We find these, for example, in Article 10(2) on weekly 
rest and 10(3) regarding on-call time. Further, there is the statement in Article 13(1) 
that ‘Every domestic worker has the right to a safe and healthy working environment’ 
which can be implemented ‘progressively, but if so only in consultation with 
representative organisations of employers and workers’. This suggests that treatment 
of domestic workers needs to be revisited by the EU in the context of social dialogue. 
                                                 
96 E. Albin and V. Mantouvalou, ‘The ILO Convention on Domestic Workers: From 
the Shadows to the Light’, (2012) 41(1) Industrial Law Journal 67 at 75-7. 
 39 
We seek to address the extent to which it is feasible for the EU to change the 
approach taken to domestic work in the light of ‘flexicurity’.  
 
To date ‘flexicurity’ has been largely concerned with enabling a more flexible labour 
market, which enables employers to dismiss with relative ease and to hire in response 
to   fluctuations in their economic circumstances, while workers are offered forms of 
social security and training which enable them to be excellent candidates for future 
work where employers can afford to hire. The flexibility envisaged is more concerned 
with movement in and out of jobs, as they become available, but less with the forms 
that jobs take. While formal legal treatment of part time jobs and fixed term work as 
‘equal’ to conventional full time and ongoing work, there are flaws in the EU 
legislative instruments and inadequate protection is given to those engaged in forms 
of agency and casual work in which women are over-represented.97 We consider that 
this needs to change.  
 
There are two justifications for paying more attention to flexibility of hours, location 
and other forms of work. One is the pragmatic argument linked to employment 
promotion. If you want people to enter certain forms of paid work where there is a 
skill shortage, you may need to offer them significant incentives to do so, such as 
shorter working time. If domestic workers are to be given ‘decent work’ which is 
fairly paid, does not involve excessive on call hours or unsafe working conditions, 
                                                 
97 See the analysis of M. Rönnmar, ‘Flexicurity, Labour Law and the Notion of Equal 
Treatment’, in M. Rönnmar (ed.), Labour Law: Fundamental Rights and Social 
Europe (Hart, 2011). See also N. Countouris and R. Horton, ‘The Temporary Agency 
Work Directive: Another Broken Promise?’ (2009) 38 Industrial Law Journal 329. 
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their labour becomes more expensive and workers may need flexibility in jobs to do 
housework and caring work themselves. Further, it would be naïve to see incentives to 
work as purely monetary, given the very natural desire that most workers have to 
reconcile home and family life, for example to spending some significant periods of 
time each week caring for their own children. This can be linked to the second, 
arguably stronger, normative argument, namely Busby’s identification of a ‘right to 
care’ which, as a right of all people and therefore all workers, should be recognised in 
the EU labour market and under EU law.98 In this way, ‘equality issues emerge not as 
a discrete specialism within the field of labour law, but rather as a pervasive theme 
which penetrates both its inner core and outer reaches’.99   This not only entails, as 
Busby suggests, ‘radical change to or overhaul of the regulatory framework within 
which the employment relationship operates’ so as to allow greater scope for male 
and female caring relationships for dependants such as children and the elderly,100 but 
also addressing the undervaluation of the work done by those who provide care.101 In 
this way, ‘flexicurity’ as a policy could be informed by the importance of allowing 
workers flexibility to fulfil caring responsibilities; potentially entailing shorter 
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working time and different working patterns to those which dominate in traditionally 
prestigious well-paid occupations.   
 
To what extent, then, does it seem that the EU may adapt in the future to the pressing 
demands of ‘flexicurity’ in the context of employment promotion? There are two key 
Commission policy documents that offer us pointers in this regard.  
 
The first is the 2010 Communication from the Commission on ‘Europe 2020: A 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ issued in 2010, in which the 
objective of getting women into work continues to be stressed, following the financial 
and economic crisis.102  The only allowance made for the structural difficulties in 
female engagement in male work patterns seems to be appreciation that: ‘Access to 
childcare facilities and care for other dependents will be important in this respect.’103 
Fundamentally changing working hours for all workers so that they can accommodate 
their own housework and care is not contemplated; nor is a recommendation made for 
greater provision of state resources to assist with caring responsibilities. Indeed, the 
latter would have been anomalous given advocacy of reduction of public spending in 
the context of Commission authorised austerity packages.104 Instead, greater recourse 
                                                 
102 See Commission Communication, ‘Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth’ COM(2010) 2020 at 3 notes that only 63% of women are in 
work compared to 76% of men’, which is seen as unsatisfactory. See also 16. 
103 COM(2010)2020 at 16. 
104 See for e.g. A. Koukiadaki and L. Kretsos, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: The 
Sovereign Debt Crisis and Labour Market Regulation in Greece’, (2012) 41 Industrial 
Law Journal 276. 
 42 
to migrant and potentially cheaper labour seems to be accepted, with a commitment 
by the Commission to ‘promote a forward-looking and comprehensive labour 
migration policy which would respond in a flexible way to the priorities and needs of 
labour markets’.105 In our view this document seems pragmatically naïve and 
normatively impoverished. There is an absence of a concrete commitment to provide 
‘decent’ work for either the secondary (predominantly female) precarious workforce 
or the underclass of domestic workers which traditional ‘male’ work patterns render 
necessary. 
 
The second document is the Communication from the Commission ‘Towards a Job-
Rich Recovery’ issued in 2012.106 This is a policy document more directly informed 
by the experience of the recent European recession and continuing financial crisis. 
Once again the aim is to support ‘job creation’, but in so doing, to ‘improve the labour 
market situation of more vulnerable groups, such as young, female, less-skilled, older 
workers as well as those from a minority background’.107 This seems potentially in 
tune with our analysis of what ‘flexicurity’ could become in the EU, but much of the 
document entails a repetition of what we have come to expect as formulaic regarding 
the significance of relocation and retraining, particularly in relation to green jobs, the 
EU health workforce and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
employment.108 There is more promise in the ‘Commission Staff Working Document 
on an Action Plan for the EU Health Workforce’ which accompanies the 2012 
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Communication.109 It is concerned with addressing ‘the shortages of the EU health 
workforce’ and boosting ‘job creation’.110 One difficulty lies in how to recruit and 
retain highly skilled heath care workers, such as specialists, doctors and nurses, in the 
light of more tempting job opportunities abroad. There is recognition in the document 
that a failure to address the increase of female doctors in terms of long working hours 
appears to operate as ‘a disincentive in this sector’.111 There seems to be appreciation 
here, not voiced in the Commission Communication, of an actual need to reshape 
working practices: ‘The EU could assist in further exploration of factors that 
contribute to a supportive working environment’.112 This perhaps could lead to a 
reshaping of working norms to enable those workers who are also ‘carers’ to 
accommodate work and family life. 
 
Less is said about the role of unskilled care workers, but there is recognition that 
while 55% of those in the healthcare sector have a post-secondary school degree, 
there will be extensive opportunities also for the medium and unskilled in the sector.  
There is also a suggestion that use of (even skilled) migrant labour to deal with 
shortages should be dealt with through forms of ‘ethical recruitment’.113 Active 
attention is also to be paid to the registration and training of healthcare assistants 
under a pilot project to offer longer term opportunities in the sector. Clearly however, 
there is much more which could be said in order for EU policy to have the 
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transformative effect required to enable both the secondary and tertiary workforce to 
enjoy decent terms and conditions of work. 
 
There is however no indication that basic health and safety rights and working time 
regulation will apply to low-skilled care workers. The document is also strangely 
silent on how the contracting out of care will operate at a time when there have been 
significant cuts in public spending. The matter will be kept under review and be the 
subject of ‘social dialogue’, but scope for engaging isolated home care workers in 
forms of collective representation is not discussed.  
 
We conclude, therefore, that while domestic workers may welcome the EU’s 
endorsement of ratification of Convention No. 189, there is scope for further EU 
action to enable the application of labour standards to their work. There is an 
emergent but still limited appreciation of the need for the EU to lead on transforming 
patterns of work and offering more genuine forms of flexible working. At present, the 
EU risks accusations of hypocrisy insofar as cheap domestic labour maintains current 
employment promotion policies. EU institutions need to revisit and rethink the place 
of domestic work in Europe.  
 
